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CHAPTER 1 
THE MOVE TOWARDS A RIGHTS-BASED FISHERY 
With Canada's implementation of the 200 mile exclusive 
economic zone in 1977, came the hopes of a brighter, more 
prosperous future for those in the groundfish industry. An 
unfortunate result of moving foreign fleets outside of the 
200-mile limit however, was the development of a Canadian 
fishing effort equally capable of depleting the resource. 
In response, fisheries managers, concerned about the 
offshore groundfish sector1 began to experiment with quota 
licences referred to as enterprise allocations (EAs) -- a 
quasi-property right to harvest a certain quantity of fish. 
In theory, assigning individual or enterprise quota rights, 
whether by absolute quanti ties or percentage of the total 
allowable catch (TAC), encourages quota holders to 
cooperate in resource management, clearly defining shares 
in the current catch and also in all potential yields. 
This, in turn, should provide quota holders with a strong 
incentive to support sustainable fishing practices, 
1 Offshore groundfish sector is denoted by any vessel greater than 100 
feet in length. 
3 
research, and stock enhancement. In practice, however, 
early evidence suggests adifferent story. 
The Atlantic Groundfish Fishery: Its Future (1995), a 
report of the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries states 
that: 
the evidence suggests that a major drawback to 
quota licence is the incentive they offer to 
misreport and intentionally reject [discard] low-
value fish for higher-valued fish, especially if 
the individual quotas are too small to be 
economically viable. The practice of highgrading, 
in turn, imposed a heavier and costlier burden of 
enforcement, monitoring, and surveillance on 
fisheries managers (29-30). 
The EA program was introduced to Canada's offshore 
groundfish fishery in 1982. Since then, this management 
system has produced the desired effect in so far as it has 
promoted efficiency and value-maximization behaviour among 
the companies. However, the evidence of improved resource 
management as expressed in motivation and behaviour is 
sparse and mixed. Angel et al. (1994} report a significant 
improvement in dockside enforcement through an industry-
funded, dockside-monitoring program. Similarly, in a 
sociological study of the impact of Individual Transferable 
Quotas (ITQs) on stewardship (conservation ethic), Creed 
(1996) maintains that, "there is some credence in the claim 
that ITQs foster stewardship, even among those who are not 
4 
IQ owners, the crew and the captain" (73). In addition, she 
notes that those interviewed attributed the reduced level 
of illegal fishing to the introduction of square mesh, an 
industry funded dockside monitoring program, tough 
administrative sanctions, and the incentive to save fish 
for the future that the ITQ system made possible (73). 
Arbuckle and Drummond (1999) note that in a New Zealand ITQ 
for shellfish (scallops and oysters) a spectrum of informal 
and formal relationships within the industry, and between 
the industry, government and other stakeholders has 
developed. Further, self-governance initiatives in this 
fishery have contributed significantly to sustainable 
management. Similarly, in examining ITQs in Canada and the 
United States McCay et al. (1996) discovered that: 
Attitudes, if not behaviour, are indeed 
changing ... Those who have invested in ITQs want to 
prevent quota busting by vessels that do not 
report their catch. They recognize that if fish 
are landed that are not reported it is not 
possible to use quota management for sustainable 
fisheries management (22). 
However, not all are convinced of their benefits for 
conservation. Copes (1986) states that, 
There is no reason to assume that fishermen, 
where confronted with the rules of individual 
quota management, will lose either their 
ingenuity at circumvention of their incentive to 
5 
promote individual interest at the expense of 
collective interest (132). 
Similarly, Mace (1993) argues that "private owners cannot 
be counted upon to do the right thing for the resource and 
that therefore, government must retain its responsibilities 
in managing fisheries" (30) . This argument is hinged upon 
the idea that property rights provide a greater incentive 
to misreport and highgrade in the short run, then to 
conserve resources for the future. In fact, this has been 
the experience for the Scotia-Fundy offshore groundfishery. 
Most regulations associated with quota management 
(misreporting, discarding, dumping, and highgrading) have 
not been enforceable. Moreover, many of these illegal 
fishing activities have increased as a result of EA and ITQ 
programs (Angel et al., 1994) . In A Report Card on Quota 
Management: The Scotia -Fundy Groundfish Experience (1994), 
Sinclair and colleagues contend that after the introduction 
of the enterprise allocations in the offshore groundfish 
sector, there was a slight reduction in fishing effort and 
fleet capacity. However, the expected benefits in better 
fishing practices (as suggested in Kirby, 1983) have not 
been realized. 
They [vessel captains] discard and dump beginning 
with the smaller fish of the most restrictive 
quotas (highgrading) or the entire catch of 
6 
prohibited species 1 in order to stay on the water 
to fish for available quotas" (37). 
1.1 THESIS RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if an ethic 
of conservation arose as a result of the implementation of 
quasi-property rights in the Scotia-Fundy offshore 
groundfish fishery between 1983 and 1993. Focus is on past 
and present fishing practices to determine whether 
attitudes and behaviours have changed to reflect the 
connection between present fishing practices and the future 
sustainablity of the groundfish fishery. The study argues 
that there is some evidence to conclude that participants 
in the industry are becoming more conservation minded. 
Further, some companies have taken a proactive approach 
such that the mistakes of the past will not be repeated in 
the future. 
1.2 THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The organization of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 
2 outlines the historical development of Canada's offshore 
fishery and traces its progression from a small boat, 
inshore fishery to the modern day offshore trawler fleet. A 
prevalent theme in this chapter is the effects of 
7 
technological innovations on the fishery and the resources 
in the Northwest Atlantic. 
Chapter 3 describes the evolution of fisheries 
management philosophy in Canada from common property (open 
access) to quasi-property rights. It also discusses the 
theory underlying a rights based approach to fisheries 
management. 
Chapter 4 reviews the methodology used in this study. 
This chapter commences with a brief summation of the 
benefits of utilizing a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methodology. From there it proceeds to discuss 
the research project; sample and setting, selection of 
interviewees, interview protocol, ethical considerations, 
data collection and analysis of collected information. 
Chapter 5 presents research findings drawn from the 
data obtained from the industry participant interviews, 
discarding data on observed and non-observed vessel trips 1 
and the measurement of variance in length frequency data on 
land and at sea. As well, past and present fishing 
practices are described, paying particular attention to the 
movement towards a conservation ethic and potential self-
governance in the offshore groundfishery. 
Chapter 6 briefly restates the research findings and 
conclusions. Policy implications for future fisheries 
8 
management initiatives are explored in light of the 
research findings. 
9 
CHAPTERl 
HISTORY OF CANADA'S OCEAN FISHERY 
2.1 PRE-MODERN PERIOD - Beginnings to 1945 
Atlantic Canada's ragged coastline and painted 
landscape has lured a hardy breed of men and women to 
settle on its shores (Pope, 1997). Starting in the 
sixteenth century, Europeans came for fish and for the next 
two hundred years, Fr-ench and English fought over the 
+-' ques .... lon of fishing rights and access to 
near-shore and mid-shore fishing banks 
the lucrative 
(Innis, 1954; 
Kurlansky, 1997; Briere, 1995) . For more than two hundred 
years, the fishery has been the mainstay of the regional 
economy. Although many have left for one reason or another 
in recent years, the fishery remains prominent in all 
Atlantic provincial economies. 
In its infancy, the _industry was characterized by 
community-based, low-tech, small boat, and credit based 
inshore operations. As a result, it was slow to develop and 
had not attracted the large capital investment that marked 
patterns of co~~ercial development in the fisheries of 
other parts of the world. Nonetheless, by the end of the 
twentieth century, a number of technological innovations 
affected this industry. Time would prove that these changes 
10 
would revolutionize the industry from a seasonal wet/dry, 
salted fish market to year round production of fresh/frozen 
fish for North American consumption. The most significant 
of the technological advancements contributing to this 
transformation was the development of the steam or gas-
powered trawler, and refrigeration allowing longer 
preservation of the product (Innis, 1954: 422-28, Sinclair, 
1985:57-65). 
By the end of the 19th century, fishers in Atlantic 
Canada caught a variety of species including herring, 
mackerel, and lobster. But, the mainstays were dermersal 
species or groundfish -- cod, haddock, pollack, and hake. 
The industry's fish catching technology had changed little 
from that introduced by French, English, and Spanish 
fishers in the 16th century (Innis, 1954; Abreu-Ferreira, 
1995; Briere, 1995) . Fish were caught on handlines or 
long lines and were preserved by wet salting or a 
corr~ination of salting and air-drying. This method of 
production persisted because dried saltfish stored and 
transported well 1 and had a considerable shelf life 
(Briere, 1995). The majority of Canada's dried saltfish was 
exported to Southern Europe and the Caribbean. Generally, 
the Caribbean markets accepted lower quality fish and were 
d~~ping grounds for fish not wanted by other markets 
11 
(Innis, 1954: 426). By the end of the 19th century, Norway 
and Iceland had taken over most of the valuable Southern 
European dried fish markets in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and 
Greece. This had an unsettling effect on the Canadian dried 
fish trade (Candow, 1995: 144-46). 
By the early 1900's, the development of rail 
transportation made possible fresh fish markets in Quebec, 
Ontario and the Northeast United States from major shipping 
destinations in the Maritimes. The fresh fish trade began 
to assume a significant proportion of the market, and grew 
rapidly. Initially, high transportation costs restricted 
fresh fish shipments to more expensive varieties such as 
halibut or salmon. However, with technological improvements 
in freight refrigeration and improved rail scheduling, a 
wider variety of species were exported. Improvements in 
quality, cost and speed of service soon enabled the fresh 
fish market to establish itself as a viable alternative to 
dried fish. 2 
Despite improvements in transportation, fresh fish 
dealers had to contend with seasonal variations in the 
supply of fish. During the surnmer, there was a consistent 
2 
"The fresh fish exports from Canso grew from 162 in 1891 to 970 
tons in 1895, and to 1 1 450 tons in 1900" (Balcoms 1997). 
12 
supply of fresh fish from inshore fishers. 3 In the winter, 
however, fishing was contingent upon favourable weather 
conditions. The year round de."'t' .. and for fresh fish provided 
the stimulus for the development of a new winter fishery. 
Sailing from Halifax and Lunenburg, and using longlines to 
catch cod and haddock, a fleet of fishing schooners began 
to make 7 to 10 day trips to the western banks. At times, 
and dependant upon good weather, it proved to be successful 
in supplying fresh fish to winter markets (Balcom, 1995: 
187-88) . 
With improvements in transportation and emerging 
markets were simultaneous efforts to increase production. 
Fishers considered adopting the then current British 
fishing technology, the otter trawl~ 4 The first experiment 
in Nova Scotia with otter trawl fishing took place in 
December 1897. A.N. Whitman and Son of Canso, acquired a 
3 Inshore fishers benefited from the fresh fish trade. They 
received immediate returns for their fish, instead of waiting 
until the end of the season which was often the case in the dried 
fish fishery. In addition, fishers were getting a higher price 
for fresh than for dry fish. 
4 Prior to the development of the otter trawl -- forerunner to the 
modern dragger or trawler fishers in the North Sea were 
experimenting with a beam trawl. An oak beam (12ft long) was 
attached to a woven mesh net, and used to keep the mouth of the 
net open. In addition, runners were attached to each end of the 
beru~ to keep the net off the bottom, reducing the resistance of 
the seafloor. With the early designs, sail power 1.vas used to tow 
13 
wooden steam trawler Active from Aberdeen, Scotland, and 
outfitted the vessel with otter boards and trawls. (Balcom, 
1995: 188) Otter boards were large rectangles of wood 
weighted with lead and iron. Each wing of the trawl had an 
otter board attached to it by a steel cable connected to 
the vessel. When under tow, the otter boards forced the 
mouth of the net open by directing water pressure inward, 
while their weight kept the trawl on the bottom. The bottom 
part of the net (the jaw) was fitted with footgear 
comprised of metal bobbins, or rollers that bounce along 
the seafloor. The top of the net (headline) was outfitted 
with floats that lift the upper lip o-f the net, giving 
height to the opening (Rogers, 1995) . 
Unfortunately, the experiment was a failure. Whitman 
reported that the vessel was too slow and did not have the 
power to pull the net fast enough {Rogers, 1995; Balcom 
1997) . 
Despite the failure of the Active, interest in trawler 
technology continued to flourish. Reports of fishing 
success using the otter trawl began to spread from fishing 
ports around the Maritimes (Innis, 1954:423). At the same 
time, inshore fishers began to protest the use of domestic 
the net. However, soon afterwards, sail power would be replaced 
with steam and diesel. 
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trawler technology, and what they saw as potential monopoly 
and corporate control of the fresh fish industry (Balcom, 
1995; Rogers, 1995) . 
Source: Saolowitz, Ronald. "Bottoa Tending Gear Used In 
New Enqland" in ~E~f~f~ec~t~s_o~f~F~is~h~~~-n~g~G~e~a~r~o~n~t~h~e~Se~a~f~l~oo~r~o~f 
New England. 
With World War I came opportun>ties and constraints 
for the new industry. Increased demand for fish, coupled 
with ~n interruption in the ability of European competitors 
to f111 lhr demand, 5 resulted in a considerable increase in 
fish prices. However, wartime competi t Lon for capital and 
labour limited new vessel construction, and the ability of 
fishing interests to capitalize on the situation. As a 
result, very few, if any, new trawlers were introduced to 
the fleet. 
' The outbr•ak ot ~artime hostilities made the nor~heast Atlantic 
unsafe tor fishing. 
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By late 1918, the war had ended, and strong fresh fish 
markets in the United States encouraged a growth of the 
trawler industry. At the same time, stream trawlers were 
beginning to demonstrate their efficiency in production. 
Balcom (1997) states that in ~1903 an excellent catch for a 
schooner on a ten-day trip was 170,000 lbs. By 1925, a 
steam trawler could catch twice that in half of the time." 
(190) Similarly, Innis notes that, 
diesel engines heightened the efficiency of 
trawlers and contributed to a marked increase in 
catch, especially after 1928. In 1931, 58 percent 
of fish landed were caught by trawlers and 
draggers. (242) 
This dramatically increased catching capacity and 
prompted inshore fishers to demand curtailing their use. 
The 1927 Royal Commission investigating the problems of the 
East Coast fishing industry provided a forum for the 
trawler controversy. The indictment against trawler 
technology was focused in two general areas: conservation 
of fish resources and economic problems (the protection of 
fishermen) . It was feared that trawlers would damage cod 
and haddock spawn, feeding grounds, and destroy fish 
recruitment by the indiscriminant catching of undersized 
juvenile fish. The commission stated that although most of 
the allegations against trawler technology were 
16 
inconclusive, there was, however, enough evidence to 
conclude that trawling had the potential to be destructive 
to juvenile fish such that there would "ultimately be very 
serious depletion of the fisheries. " 6 The commission 
recommended that a ban be placed on the introduction of new 
trawlers, and strict controls on the use of existing 
trawlers. As a result, the number of trawlers fishing 
Atlantic Canada's waters did not increase significantly in 
the next two decades. During the same period, the advanced 
fishing nations of the world increased their catching 
capacity using this new technology while the Atlantic 
region remained a small boat fishery with only marginal 
growth in yearly groundfish production (Balcom, 1995) . 
2.2 MODERNIZATION 1945-1977 
The end of World War II brought a sense of optimism 
throughout the Canadian economy. The government of Canada 
turned its intentions towards industrial development 1 
playing a proactive role in the development of a new, 
modern fishery. In doing so, it forever changed the role of 
the state in the Atlantic fishery. The federal Department 
6 Quoted in Balcom (1997), p. 92-93 from the Royal Commission 
Investigating the Fisheries of the Maritime Provinces [1928] . 
17 
of Fisheries and Oceans, led by the Deputy Minister of 
Fisheries, Stewart Bates argued, in 1944, that in order for 
Canada to take its rightful place among other leading 
fishing nations, it had to r'modernize" its fishing industry 
(Bates, 1944: 111) . For Bates 1 the term modernization did 
not mean building bigger, more powerful vessels; it implied 
adopting new attitudes, and values, moving away from old 
trading systems, and focusing on the emergent North 
American consu..'ti.er culture. Bates argued that the two main 
sectors of the fishing industry fresh/frozen fish 
(trawler fishey) , and the inshore fishery were 
undercapitalized, inefficient, and lacking in the 
technology necessary to increase production (Bates, 
1944:11-12). Further, he maintained that future success was 
predicated on the consolidation and centralization of the 
fishing industry. 
The tardiness of development has allowed 
interests that were vested in the older forms of 
the fish trade (particularly saltfish) to 
maintain their influence, their outlook and 
vision over most of the fishing industry and its 
associated institutions. Even the techniques of 
production in fresh fishing has tended to be 
confined within the horizons of those interested 
primarily in the older branch of the trade. 
(Bates 1944, 33) 
A fully modernized fishery needed new technology 
trawlers, mechanized cold storage, refrigerated 
18 
transportation but more importantly, a new ' • +-Splrl .... of 
enterprise, and a vision of the future that would filter 
through the entire Atlantic fishing industry. Clearly 
apparent throughout the Bates report was the assuroption 
that the fresh/frozen fish industry offered the best hope 
for the future. A modern offshore industry using trawlers 
and large-scale processing had the greatest potential to 
attract significant capital investment (Wright, 1997) . The 
government could and should he argued take a proactive role 
in assisting the modernization and development of this 
fishery. 7 He maintained that by developing an offshore fleet 
that operated year round, it would make better use of large 
fisheries resources reducing unemployment, economic 
inequality, and poverty {Bates, 1944: 111). He explained 
that one of the key goals of modernization was to raise 
fisher's incomes by encouraging them to fish more 
efficiently and productively. 
7 In the post World War II period, two approaches were applied to 
economic problems by western governments: Keynesian, and 
modernization. Although both involved fostering capitalism, 
Keynesianism was applied in areas already industrialized, whereas 
the modernist approach tended to be used in underdeveloped 
regions. According to the modernist paradigm, traditional 
societies needed to be infused with capital, technology, and 
education in order that they may become a modern, capitalist 
society. 
19 
Many of Batesws views regarding the direction of 
fisheries policy for Atlantic Canada occurred. The domestic 
fishery adopted many of the modern developments; new 
technologies in fish finding, catching, and processing. 8 
Moreover, capital was attracted to the fishery as economic 
conditions improved; and more importantly, the industry 
experienced a period of relative stability. This new 
optimism provided the incentive for change at the corporate 
level the formation of National Sea Products (NSP) in 
Lunenburg, Nova Scotia. With trawler fleets for harvesting 
and processing plants for handling fish, vertical 
integration began to characterize the groundfish industry. 
Through a series of mergers and acquisitions, National Sea 
Products grew to become one the biggest fishing companies 
in the world (Barrett, 1984). 
In 1949, the ban on development of a Canadian trawler 
fleet was lifted, and programs of government incentives 
were designed to assist in the modernization of the 
domestic fishery. By 1962, the domestic offshore trawler 
fleet numbered thirty-seven vessels, a sign that Canada was 
8 The most significant Canadian contribution to fisheries 
technology was the development of the Atlantic Western trawl. 
This was a four panel or box trawl that provided a greater 
vertical opening and much better catches of high-swimming species 
like cod and haddock. 
20 
equipping itself to compete with the foreign offshore 
fleets fishing in the northwest Atlantic {Barrett 1 1984). 
The side-trawler was soon replaced by the new stern 
trawler. With wheelhouse moved forward to create more 
workable deck space as well as to accommodate the stern 
ramp 1 it made it possible to haul a much larger net up the 
stern of the vessel. 
Souris III - 65ft Side Trawler (circa 1956) 
Source: www.iosphere.net/-ian/boats/trawlers.htm 
More importantly, it allowed the fleet to fish in rough 
conditions; the vessel could be kept bow to the waves and 
wind while the net was being hauled aboard. 9 Given the long 
9 In rough conditions, the side-trawler had to lay "side to" 
the wind when hauling the net, greatly increasing the chances 
of getting knocked over. This limited the amount that a side-
21 
distance traveled (up to 200 miles offshore), and the 
variability 
• 
N.ational a.• 
source: m.tional 
111 
. ...... 
Sea Products Achi ves 
of weather conditions in the Northwest Atlantic, these 
changes greatly increased the effectiveness of this 
technolooy. The influence that these technological 
transCormatlons had on the offshore fishery cannot be 
understated. They led to an exponential growth in the index 
of tishlno effort -- a combination ot days fished by gross 
tonnage- and record catches landed (Blake 1997: 208). 
In 1954, the British successfully introduced the !irst 
factory freezer,stern-trawler, F~jrtry, and forever altered 
the nature of fishing throughout the world. Prior to the 
trawler could haul per tow. This was only one ot tM 
disadvanta9es when compared to the new stern trow!er 
technol09Y· 
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introduction of the factory trawler, fishing technology had 
been restricted to fishing relatively adjacent to 
processing plants and markets. The Fairtry changed all of 
this. Distance was no barrier and the rewards were great 
600 tons of groundfish could be caught and processed in 40 
days. The harvesting of fish became a global pursuit. 10 
At more than 280 ft. in length and 2, 600 gross 
tonnage, it was the first trawler that combined 
stern-trawling with on-board filleting machinery, 
freezing capability, and a fish reduction 
(fishmeal) plant; it became a model for a 
generation of fishing vessels (Blake, 1997:208). 
With open access to groundfish stocks outside Canada's 
three-mile limit 1 these massive vessels could exploit 
Canada's adjacent fish resources like never before. By the 
1960's, many other nations began to fish the Canadian 
Continental shelf. Poland, East Germany, Spain, Portugal 
and Japan -- one of the largest fishing fleets in the world 
sent factory trawlers to the Grand Banks. Scott and 
Neher (1982) stated that: 
Following the Second World War, a virtual fishing 
explosion took place in the northwest Atlantic as 
steel, steam-powered fishing vessels with fish-
finding devices and improved gear began to 
dominate the offshore fisheries... By the 1950s 
there were many cases of concentrated fishing 
10 Blake (1997) reported that by 1956, the Soviet Union had a 
fleet of 24 factory freezer trawlers identical to the Fairtry 
fishing on the Grand Banks, and within 2 years 11 more were 
added. 
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decimating certain stocks, and 
overfishing became the order of the day~ 
general 
(18) 
A resource that, at the beginning of the century, was 
believed to be boundless11 was under attack and Canada was 
either unwilling or unable to stop the pillage. Despite the 
warnings of scientists and fisheries managers -about the 
possible consequences of over fishing and resource 
depletion, fishing continued without regard for 
conservation. Foreign fleets targeted the traditional 
groundfish speciesr ~-cod, -redf±sh, -haddock, and flatfish but 
also developed new fisheries, with disastrous consequences. 
Essentially, the international fleets would target one 
species, and fish it until catch rates fell to an 
unprofitable level. They would then move on to another 
species and repeat the cycle. Significant offshore 
regulation did not emerge until 1977 when Canada declared a 
200-mile economic management zone. 
In Canada's domestic fishery, the offshore sector 
continued to grow through the postwar years to a place of 
dominance in the domestic groundfish fishery. 12 Much of the 
11 J.J. Cowie, a scientist for the Canadian Fisheries department 
in the 1920s declared that the resources in the oceans were 
infinite, and not in any way vulnerable to overfishing. 
12 In 1981, the offshore sector caught 43% of all groundfish (Kirby§ 
1982). 
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growth involved the production of new offshore trawlers 
whose construction benefited from government subsidies and 
low interest loans. Barrett ( 1983) reports that for the 
period of 1974 to 1982, the federal Department of Regional 
and Economic Expansion (DREE) provided over $64 million in 
assistance to the o££shore sector. As a result of the rapid 
expansion of the trawler fleet and shore-based processing 
facilities, the offshore catch and production in Atlantic 
Canada increased dramatically. By 1981, DFO reported that 
there were 152 regist~red vessels in the domestic offshore 
trawler fleet. 13 For some it was a sign that Canada3 s 
fishing industry had finally matured. Yet, there were many 
others that argued that the gover~ment had built a house of 
cards by encouraging overcapitalization that could not be 
sustained by the exploitative harvesting rates or the 
uncertain marketplace. 
While most of the basic characteristics of the present 
day groundfish industry had been established by 1974, 
another set of familiar, but not totally predictable, 
circumstances occ~rred in that same year, i.e., the 
apparent six to seven year cycle of boom and bust. In 1967 
the groundfish industry experienced declining end markets 
due to a recession; this resulted in an industry-wide 
13 Registered fishing vessels over 100 feet in length. 
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crisis of sufficient proportions to warrant the 
provisioning of government aid (there had also been a 
significant downturn six or seven _years earlier). In 1974, 
the crisis was further exacerbated by declining catch rates 
and greatly increased fuel costs. The industry 
particularly the large trawler companies-- was on it knees. 
The Canadian goverTh~ent responded in two ways: it provided 
short term aid to the industry in order to tide it over the 
crisis period; and it carried out an extensive policy 
review which did much to influence future fisheries policy 
formulation. 
2.3 EVOLUTION OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 1945-11 
In the immediate post World War II era, there appeared 
to be little, if any, need to regulate the Northwest 
Atlantic fisheries, which at that time were 
international common property resource (uncontrolled 
exploitation) . Since most species were not thought to be 
exploited at any-where near their potential, fishery 
resources appeared to be limitless. However, the appearance 
of foreign trawler fleets in ever increasing numbers beyond 
nautical jurisdictions, and past experiences with declining 
catches due to overexploitation seen in other fisheries, 
was sufficient inducement for all the major national 
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players to set up the International Commission for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) in 1949. Throughout 
the 1950's, ICNAF' s mandate was to undertake research to 
better understand the growth and behaviour of fish stocks 
and bring order to the fishery by establishing minimlli~ mesh 
sizes to reduce the catch of small groundfish. 14 This 
mandate was expanded in the 1970's to include control of 
the exploitation rate, establishing a total allowable catch 
(TAC) with annual quota allocations for the member states 
for various stocks (Mocklinghoff 1 1973). ICNAF took this 
regulatory action because of the decline in abundance of 
groundfish stocks during the 1969-75 period. These new 
policy initiatives were difficult to enforce; there were no 
mechanisms to ensure that countries would abide by their 
allotted quota. Further, even if a nation was in violation 
of a regulation, there were no sanctions available to deter 
such behaviour in the future. The result was considerable 
overfishing on the part of member nations (Blake, 1997; 
Pinhorn and Halliday, 1990) . 
14 By the mid 1960 9 s 1 some ICNAF members were warning that fishing 
activity was approaching; or had already exceeded the maximum 
sustainable yield for several of the most valuable groundfish 
species. Further, the ICNAF has done little to deal with the 
problem of overfishing, and that something had to be done to 
curtail the fishing effort. 
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The fisheries management objective fundamental to 
ICNAF operation was the Maximum Sustainable Yield or {MSY) 
-- the maximum amount of fish that can be removed from a 
population per unit of time without affecting the 
sustainabili ty of that population. (Finlayson, 1994) This 
measure was widely accepted because it was based on a 
physical measure of the amount of fish caught. The MSY was 
reached when "removal of the older and larger fish (a 
process known as "fishing up" the accumulated stock), 
increased the r~te of reproduction or the rate of growth or 
both. If (Barrett 1984: 80) It was believed that "to harvest 
less than the maximum was to wast.e fish, and to harvest 
more than the maximum was wasteful to effort" (Larkin, 
1980:247). For management based on this notion, it was 
necessary to determine the population of fish and the 
maximum amount of fish that can be rEmoved without 
threatening its reproduction. 
At the Canadian administrative level, major emphasis 
was placed not only on biological research for Canada's 
international regulatory participation, but also on 
engineering and technological expertise (McDonald 1984; 
Doeringer and Terkla, 1995) ~ The Industrial Development 
Branch of the Department of Fisheries laid the framework 
for Canada's offshore and midshore fleet sectors. Here the 
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emphasis was placed upon technological development with 
respect to vessel and gear designs (including electronic 
navigation and rlsn finding equipment), and on vessel 
subsidies. 
During the period 1945-76, there was a remarkable 
consensus on fisheries policy and management approaches at 
the federal, provincial, and industry levels. The Canadian 
approach to fisheries management was firmly rooted in 
population estimation analysis and the application of 
economic efficiency criteria manifested in MSY (Do.eringer 
and Terkla, 1995). As well, Canada supported and placed its 
trust in ICNAF as t~e regulator of international fisheries. 
However, by the 1960's, ICNAF had proven terribly impotent. 
Although gear regulations, and quota limits were in place, 
they were essentially unenforceable. In response to these 
regulatory problems$ the federal government (Department of 
the Environment) issued its Policy for Canada's Co:m:mercial 
Fisheries (1976). The central focus o£ the new policy was 
on resource rehabilitation and industry reconstruction. The 
primary recommendation was the rejection of maximum 
sustainable yield as a management philosophy and adoption 
of a new guiding principle, the "best use", requiring 
maximization of net social benefit, or Optimuw. Sustainable 
Yield (OSY) . Since 1976, Canada has used the F0 . 1 (F= 
29 
fishing mortality) rule as the guiding principal for its 
management of fishery resources within the new 200 mile 
limit. 15 The Fo.1 reference level is the level of fishing 
mortality generally considered to be beneficial for stock 
conservation (approximately 18% of the harvestable biomass 
or F=.20). This rule {F=o.d developed as a more 
conservative replacement for the MSY as a management goal. 
As Halliday et al ( 1992) note, "in practical terms., this 
resulted in reduction in target fishing mortality (F) level 
from Fmax on the :yield-per-recruit curve, .as used by the 
ICNAF, to ~ , .1:' 0.1. (413) With the establishment of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (200 mile limit) pending, this 
measure was introduced to allow fish stocks to rebuild 
sufficiently to provide consistent and stable catch rates. 
Cowbined with a lower level of exploitation, the 
government was positioning itself to take on a new role in 
the fishery, a role that would see them directing and 
shaping the fishery of the future. Influenced by Gordon's 
economic theory of common-property resources 16 , the policy 
15 
"F" simply means fish caught by commercial vessels, and a 
nuwber in subscript to indicate the relationship o£ the weight of 
fish caught to the total exploitable biomass. 
16 Gordon argues that the fishery was a common property, to which 
all persons had rights of access. Under conditions of open 
access, competition generates overcapacity, which leads to 
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recommended control of entry into the groundfish fishery in 
an effort to reduce excess capacity in congested fleet 
segments (Rogers, 1995) . 
Since the establishment of private-property 
rights in fishery resources is impracticable in 
the great majority of cases, the state's 
responsibility for resource conservation and 
allocation cannot be delegated. 17 
It was argued that controlling access to the resource 
would, in the short term, improve economic efficiency 
within the fleets involved. To accomplish its objectives 
(resource rehabilitation and industry reconstruction), two 
main administrative policies were instituted: (1) an annual 
Groundfish Management Plan, that established TAC levels and 
catch allocations by fleet; (2) and a Licensing and Vessel 
Replacement Policy {inshore vessels) , which limited entry 
to the groundfish fishery and controlled vessel size and 
gear which could be used (Halliday et al., 1992). 
2.4 ESTABLISHING THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: Canada's 
200-MILE LIMIT 
In 1977, Canada established the EEZ giving the 
gover~~ent of Canada additional control over the harvesting 
chronic economic problems 1 as well as resource depletion (see 
Chapter 3 in this manuscript for more details). 
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of fish stocks from the coast outward to a distance of 200 
nautical miles ( Pinhorn et al., 1990) . Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans was charged with the responsibility of 
implementing fishery management programs designed to 
maintain the fisheries resources at levels sustainable for 
long-term economic and social benefits (Fraser, 1986; 
Schrank, 1995). 
Since 1977, the Northwest Atlantic coast groundfish 
resource has been governed by annual Groundfish Management 
Plans. In an effort to curb overexploitation and eventual 
depletion of groundfish stocks, DFO developed detailed 
management plans whose objectives were to prevent growth 
and recruitment overfishing (Sinclair et al., 1994; 
Halliday et al., 1992). At the same time, Canada's policy 
of modernization and fleet upgrading had the explicit 
objective of raising incomes of fishermen, enabling the 
groundfish processing industry to acquire fish supplies on 
a year round basis, as well as providing effective 
competition to the foreign fleets. 
With Canada's implementation of the EEZ, and the 
prospect of greatly increased catches, a further expansion 
of the offshore fleet had occurred, while new processing 
17 Policy for Canada's Commercial Fisheries. (1976) Ottawa: 
Department of he Enviror~ent, p. 20 
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plants were opened and others upgraded {Schrank, 1995; 
Hinds, 1995). However, the resource did not justify the 
expansion that had occurred; although the stocks were being 
allowed to rebuild under Canadian management (see &~gel et 
al 1994), they really never recovered from the 
overexploitation in the late 1960's and early 1970 1 s 
(Pinhorn et al., 1990). 
Later evidence suggests that many of the groundfish 
stocks had experienced a fishing mortality much higher than 
F0 . 1 perhaps twice or higher than Fo. 1 and this has occurred 
(Sinclair et al., 1994). Sinclair and colleagues have 
acknowledged that the total allowable catch (TAC) had been 
exceeded after the EEZ declaration and that discarding and 
misreporting greatly contributed to the problem. Thus, in 
turn, it contributed to the frequent underestimation of the 
mortality and hence the overestimation of the harvestable 
biomass (8-14). 
The resulting scenario was a classical example of "the 
tragedy of the commons" increased investment forced 
increased production, leading in turn to an unsustainable 
plundering of the resources. Thus, according to Barbara 
Neis (1992): 
Overcapitalization in the primary sector 
increases pressure upon the stocks, conceals the 
true level of fish mortality--forces participants 
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to underestimate effort thus contributing to 
inflated TAC's... Scientists overlooked the 
impact of technology, skills, knowledge and 
fishing practices and made it seem as though 
catches in the commercial trawler fishery were a 
reflection of stock he.al th, and not the result of 
changes in effort linked to technological 
improvements, cooperative fishing, and greater 
knowledge of the stocks. (157) 
In an effort to resolve this situation, quasi-property 
rights in the form of allocations to fishing enterprises 
(enterprise allocations) were established in 1982 for a 
portion of the offshore trawler fleet (McDonald, 1984). The 
four large fishing companies that operated offshore 
groundfish trawlers at that time (National Sea Products 
Ltd., Fisheries Products Ltd. 1 H.B Nickersons and Sons 
Ltd., and the Lake Group) were given, on a trial basis, 
enterprise allocations (EAs} in most commercially important 
groundfish fisheries. Using a formula based on historical 
catch, adjacency to the resource, and fishing capacity, the 
four large fishing companies negotiated quotas with DFO 
(Rettig, 1986). T~e pilot enterprise allocation project did 
not include the independent offshore group ( IOG} of 17 
smaller companies. The offshore vessels operated by the 
companies within the IGO competitively fished for the 
remaining portions of the offshore quota that had not been 
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allocated under the new enterprise allocation program 
(Fraser, 1986). 
In 1983, one year after its inception, the EA program 
for the offshore groundfish fleet was temporarily 
discontinued. However, the industry, after seeing its 
benefits, decided to continue the EA program on an informal 
basis. In the same year, the federal government, acting in 
response to public concern about the Atlantic Fishery, 
established the Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries to 
reco:mmend how to achieve and maintain a viable Atlantic 
fishing industry~ with due considerations to the overall 
economic and social development of the Atlantic provinces 
(Kirby, 1983). In 1984, at the urging of the Kirby report, 
enterprise allocations were officially reintroduced into 
the Atlantic offshore groundfish fishery for all of the 
offshore companies. Enterprise allocations were assigned as 
percentage shares of the overall offshore quota in each of 
the major groundfish stocks on an individual basis for 
National Sea Products (NSP), Fishery Products International 
(FPI) 1 and the independent offshore group of companies 
(IOG) (Fraser, 1986; Rettig, 1986). 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL APPROACH and LITERATURE REVIEW 
As indicated in Chapter 2, beginning in the 1950's was 
a significant change in the management and general 
orientation of Canadian fishery policy. The focus of 
concern shifted from purely biological aspects of fish-
stock conservation to a broader consideration of the social 
and economic aspects of the fishery. This paradigmatic 
shift seems directly related to the development of the 
economic theory of common property as applied to the 
fisheries (Gordonu 1954). The common property perspective 
led to viewing the fishery and its regulation as not only a 
biological system but being an embedded layer in a complex 
economic and social system. In other words, managing a 
fishery required moreu much more, than simply counting 
fish. 
In The Economic Theory of Co:m.t.Tlon-Property Resources: 
The Fishery, H. Scott Gordon argued that many fisheries can 
be classified as common property, to which all persons have 
rights of access. Under conditions of open access, it is 
not rational for an individual to refrain from fishing to 
ensure the conservation of the fish stocks. Should they do 
so, others would most definitely take advantage of their 
actions and capture their share of available resources. Put 
36 
simply, when resources are limited, the rational decisions 
of each individual add up to an irrational dilemma for the 
group. Thus, according to Gordon (1954), 
there appears. . to be some truth in the 
conservation dictum that everybody's property is 
nobody's property. Wealth that is free for all is 
valued by none because he who is foolhardy enough 
to wait for its proper time of use will only find 
that it has been taken by another. The fish in 
the sea are valueless to the fisherman, because 
there is no assurance that they will be there for 
him tomorrow if they are left behind today. (124} 
Those involved in regulating the fishing industry, 
trying to conserve stocks in the face of unlimited 
expansion of fishing pressure, began to feel that there was 
something fundamentally wrong with traditional open access, 
common property fisheries. Put simply, there were too many 
fishermen chasing too few fish. In "Fishing Rights as 
Instruments of Fisheries Policy" ( 1992), Pearse wrote that 
in common property, open access fisheries two identifiable 
problems exist: a conservation problem where "continuing 
expansion of harvesting pressure on stocks having limited 
natural productivity (what Hardin, (1968) might refer to as 
the "tragedy of the commons") was not sustainable" (73); 
and an economic problem, associated with the over-expansion 
of fishing fleets that became manifest in, "the waste of 
labour and capital in redundant catching capacity, 
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excessive costs, depressed incomes, and, generally the poor 
economic performance of open access, colllillon-property 
fisheries'" (73). 
It became conventional goverlli"TT.ent wisdom that 
something had to be done to intervene in the workings of 
the cornmons. 18 Needler (1979) argued for a limitation of 
fishing effort for the purposes of maintaining the fish 
stocks and yields at their optimum levels. In his opinion, 
this required some degree of limited entry to guard against 
overcapitalization (i.e., input restrictions). Similarly, 
MacKenzie (1979) asserted that restrictive measures were 
necessary to move excess labour out of the fishery and to 
prevent additional labour from entering it. He maintained 
that it was necessary to establish a professional, full-
time fishery labour force to eliminate the part-time, 
"moonlighting" fishermen that use the fishery as an 
employer of last resort (816-17). Fraser (1979) took this 
one step farther claiming that in an open-access fishery 1 
limiting the number of fishing units (vessels) was not 
adequate to control fleet expansion. Individual fishermen 
and fishing enterprises still had incentives to expand 
their tishing power to increase their shares of the catch. 
18 See the Journal of the Research Board of Canada, July (1979) for a 
series of papers that formed the basis of that shift in the value 
orientation of Canadian fisheries policy. 
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Thus, Fraser argued for additional input restrictions on 
licence transfers, vessel replacement, and types of fishing 
gear used in the hopes of curbing the trend toward "capital 
stuffingn (7 59) . 
After input restrictions (by themselves) were found to 
have limited, if any, success in discouraging the "race for 
fish" (Kirby, 1983: 213; see Pearse, 1982), fisheries' 
economists began to consider a quite different approach. 
The total allowable catch in a fishery could be allocated 
among the licenced fisherman. Then, licences would convey 
not simply a right to fish but a right to take a specific 
quantity of fish (Berkes, 1985: 200-01). Scott and Neher 
(1981) recommended that "the common-property system of open 
access to each fishery should be replaced by a system of 
individual and exclusive rights of access or capture, or 
both." (41) Likewise, Moloney and Pearse (1979) argued that 
economic efficiency (rationalization) would be promoted by 
providing individual enterprises with rights (that could 
exist in perpetuity} to harvest specific quantities of fish 
i.e., a quota allocation. The allocation of fishing rights 
would allow fishermen to maximize profits through market 
forces that would transform the industry from supply to 
demand driven and provide a disincentive for inefficient 
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and costly fishing practices (862). This would enable, it 
was thought, once competitive fishing was eliminated, that 
vessel owners, and especially vertically integrated 
companies would be in a position to respond to prices when 
it comes to catch quality, quantity and timing. 
Moreover, advocates of property rights usually 
emphasized a need to make quotas transferable or an 
"individual transferable quota" (ITQ) . Under this system of 
rights based fishing, individual fishermen and/ or fishing 
enterprises could sell their entire quota, or parts of 
their quota, to other operators for a season, a number of 
seasons, or in perpetuity (Arnason, 1993, Palmer and 
Sinclair, 1997: 68-69). The advantage of transferability of 
quota was that it further facilitates rationalization in 
the fishery. It was reasonable to assume that the prospect 
of rent would lead more efficient operators to buy the 
quota entitlements of less efficient operators. Thus, quota 
rights would be consolidated in the hands of the most 
efficient operators who would be able to fish full-time and 
reduce unit costs of operation (Arnason, 1993; Sissenwine 
and Mace, 1992) . 
The professed advantages of quota allocation 
management (property rights) lay in the removal of alleged 
important external diseconomies associated with open access 
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fisheries. It is contended that the guarantee of a quota 
means that fishers do not have to race each other to secure 
their share of the total allowable catch (Christy, 1973; 
Moloney and Pearse, 1979}. When fishers were assured of 
their quota, they could fish in the most economical way 
available to them ~- take their time, spread their effort 
optimally across the entire season, use the most economical 
configurations of gear and manpower in the process (Pearse, 
1992). The externalities inherent in co~mon property 
resources would drive fishers to act in accordance with 
their individual interests, where often it was contrary to 
their collective interest (Gordon, 1954). However, quota 
allocation management was not without its' potential 
drawbacks. It was argued that ~~ota allocations could 
provide fishers with incentives to maximize their profit 
through illegal and unconservative fishing. 
In fact, this has been alleged to be the case for the 
Scotia-Fundy EA program in the offshore groundfish sector. 
Most illegal fishing practices -- misreporting by area and 
species, d~~ping, discarding, and high-grading have 
increased rather than deceased with the introduction of 
property rights. Ftlrthermore, since introduced, most 
regulations associated with quota management have not been 
enforceable. (Sinclair et al 1994; Angel et al. 1994). 
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3.1 MISREPORTING 
Enforcement is one of the most difficult problems with a 
quota system becaus€ individuals within the industry appear 
to have been successful in finding ways to circumvent 
constraints on their fishing; misreporting is one. In an 
attempt to avoid restrictions imposed by the quota 
management system, most captains, at one point or another, 
have roisreported landings (Wilson 1994, Schiochetti 1994) . 
Misreporting of landings, roost often, has been restricted 
to roisreporting the species landed by area fished; however, 
there have been reported cases where companies were 
roisreporting species landed19 • This behaviour creates a 
serious problem for fisheries managers that require 
reasonably accurate reports on catch and effort from vessel 
operators as a basis for their estimation of stock 
strengths and optimal exploitation rates. 
3.2 DISCARDING and HIGH-GRADING 
Crean and Symes (1994) estimate that "one-third of all 
marine resources harvested in the world's capture fisheries 
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never reach the consumer, and were dissipated through post-
harvest losses.~~ ( 422) Although the problem of wastage occurs 
throughout the distribution chain, the losses are most 
significant at the point of capture. The principal cause is 
the deliberate discarding of fish at sea. The composition 
of the discarded biomass, which includes non-commercial 
material (bycatch) 1 undersized juvenile fish (highgrading) 
and mature marketable species (most times of poor quality) 
delimit the complexity of the problem. 
At this point, it would be beneficial to define the 
key terms that we will continue to emerge in this part 
of the discussion: 
o Discarding -- returning to the ocean fish caught which 
cannot be legally retained and landed according to 
regulations. 
o Dumping -- returning to the ocean fish caught which 
cannot be legally retained and landed according to 
regulations. Fish thrown overboard in a selective 
manner is interpreted as discarding (a culling 
process), while that act done indiscriminately is 
defined as dumping. 
o Highgrading -- Dumping in the ocean by size and/or by 
species of fish caught which can be legally retained 
and landed in order to maximize the value of a set 
quantity of quota. 
® Culling -- Discarding in the ocean, 
low market value, unregulated fish 
damaged or low quality fish, which 
because of their 
species and/or 
can be legally 
19 This occurred before a comprehensive dockside-monitoring 
program was instituted to curb such behaviour. 
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retained and landed. 
o Capacity Dumping Dumping in the ocean by size 
and/or by species because of the boat's capacity 
and/or processing plant capacity or requirements, when 
the fish can be legally retained and landed. 20 
Discarding is undesirable for many reasons; it 
undermines the conservation objectives of government and 
industry, it undermines effective scientific assessment in 
terms of reported data, and it is clearly, under most 
circumstances, self-destructive. However, conventional 
wisdom says that discarding is unavoidable in view of 
regulatory, stock management and market forces. 
Enviror~ental and technological limitations also contribute 
to make it unavoidable. Copes (1986) wrote that: 
The fugitive natur€ of most fish stocks, together 
with the multiple resource use of their water 
habitat, made it usually impractical, if not 
impossible, to solve the problems by dividing 
fish stocks into discrete units for which 
effective property rights would be assigned(265). 
Fisheries managers may attempt to set separate sets of 
quota allocations for different species in a mixed-stock 
fishery (Murawski, 1991). However, in a multispecies 
fishery, the probability that a fishing enterprise can 
2° Fishers taking more than their allowed quota for a certain 
species (quota busting) 1 and/or taking fish for which they have 
no quota at all (poaching) are frequent transgressions in a 
individual quota (IQ) based management system. 
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catch their quota precisely in proportion with the allotted 
amount per species is incalculable. Inevitably, they will 
fill some quotas before others and will find themselves 
with excess catches of some species when they continue to 
fish in order to fill all their species quotas. They may 
retain the excess catches, and risk consequences from DF01 
or discard them, both of which would be undesirable 
results. In this situation, it seems the only option for 
fisheries managers would be to increase the tolerance for 
excess by-catch. However, the more tolerant they are in 
order to prevent discarding and quota overruns, the more 
fishing enterprises will "accidentally" take larger excess 
by-catches~ particularly of the more valuable species in 
the mix. 
In theory, it is argued that assigning an enterprise 
quota rights encourages quota holders to cooperate in 
resource management by clearly defining shares in the 
current catch and also in all potential yields. This, in 
turn, should provide quota holders with a strong incentive 
to support sustainable fishing practices 1 research, and 
stock enhancement (Walters and Pearse, 1996). Put simply, 
if fishers have a guaranteed stake in the future of a 
resource, there is an expectation that they will actively 
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work to ensure the continued sustainablity of the resource. 
The central idea is that a private property owner is much 
more likely than a non-owner to care about the long-term 
quality and quantity of their resources. Pearse {1992), he 
reports that when this management regime was introduced in 
New Zealand's deepwater fisheries, it produced significant 
benefits in terms of stock conservation. "The entire 
regulatory and enfqrcement effort had shifted from poli-cing 
fishermen on the fishing grounds to monitoring landings and 
reconciling them w~th the quota holding of the fishermen~" 
(77) Arbuckle and Drummond (1999) note that in a New 
Zealand ITQ fishery for shellfish {scallops and oysters), a 
spectrum of informal and formal relationships within the 
industry, and between the industry, government and other 
stakeholders developed. Further, self-goverance initiatives 
in this fishery have contributed significantly to 
sustainable management. This process is enhanced when 
fishers perceive management goals and fishing regulations 
to be fair, equitable and necessary to maintain the 
integrity of the resource. To this end, resource 
stewardship is thought to be greatly enhanced when fishers 
are actively involved in the management process. 
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However, not all are convinced of their benefits for 
conservation. Mace (1993) argues that ~private owners 
cannot be counted upon to do the right thing for the 
resource and that therefore, government must retain its 
responsibilities in managing fisheries." (30) This argument 
is hinged upon the idea that property rights provide a 
greater incentive to misreport and highgrade in the short 
run, then to conserve resources for the future. In a survey 
of fishers along the south coast of England, Robinson and 
Pascoe (1997) found that in the face of unpredictable 
resources, profit maximization was the primary objective of 
most fishers (4}. 
I' 11 tell you when it all comes down to it. 
Fishermen are without any doubt the greediest 
people on earth. If you give'em fish to catch, he 
won't quit until he catches every last one of 
them. And if someone else caught 200,000 lbs. in 
60 hours, I'd want to catch 225,000 in 59 hours. 
It's just the way it is. There was alot of 
competition between all the skippers in the 
fleet. If you arrived home without a full load of 
fish, everyone would look at you sideways. 
Naturally the money had alot to do with it. 
I suppose you could call it greed if you wanted 
to, but for us, we had to get a trip of fish. It 
didn't matter what I had to do. When I left the 
dock, it didn't matter what I had to go through, 
I was going for a load of fish. And that's all 
you had in your mind, you gotta get fish, you 
were going out there to make a livin~ 
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In examining the implementation of Individual Quotas 
(IQs) the Dutch groundfish sea fishery, Wim Davidse (1999) 
writes that property rights, in and of themselves, were not 
successful in promoting a cons€rvation ethic or a movement 
towards co-management. Quota busting and poaching21 forced 
the managing authority to implement a system where the 
industry becomes co-responsible for compliance with 
national quotas. This system of enforcement pooled industry 
participants and their quotas into management groups, and 
made each group responsible for compliance with the total 
quota of its members. 
Property rights alone are not effective in 
promoting co-management. They should be 
accompanied with adequate enforcement to insure 
that fishers are not exceeding quota 
allocations." (6) 
Similarly, McCay (1996) states that: 
It remains an open question whether the incentive 
to discard and highgrade can be counterbalanced 
by other features of the ITQ programs, including 
the possible creation of a "conservation ethic. n 
(10) 
In summary, there are strong arguments put forward 
from both sides of the rights-based management debate. 
21 Fishers taking more than their allowed quota for a certain 
species (quota busting), and/or taking fish for which they have 
no quota at all (poaching) are frequent transgressions in a 
individual quota (IQ) based management system. 
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Those who support allocating individual fishing rights are 
convinced that if fishers have a guaranteed stake in the 
future of a resource, they will support conservative 
fishing practices and resource management. However, there 
are others who contend that if left to themselves, fishers 
will choose short-term profits over long-term 
sustainability. The growth of discarding in the EA program 
is indicative of a hubristic tendency to continue 
unsustainable practices without regard for the pending 
consequences. Why did such a tendency continue when the 
consequences of discarding were already becoming manifest? 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN -and -METHOOOLOGY 
Considerable disagreement exists over appropriateness 
of various methods and methodological stances for 
conducting evaluation research. One debate of growing 
intensity centers on the distinction between quantitative 
and qualitative methods. By quantitative methods, 
researchers have come to mean the techniques of randomized 
experiments, quasi-experiments, multivariate statistical 
analysis, sample surveys, and the like. In sharp contrast, 
qualitative methods ethnography, case studies, 
structured and semi,...structured interviews and _participant 
observation - is utilized for its descriptiveness and for 
its analysis through the language of its respondents. 
Bogdan and Taylor (1975) describe qualitative methods as: 
Research procedures that produce descriptive 
data: people's own written or spoken words and 
observable behaviour. This approach... directs 
itself at settings and the individuals within 
those settings holistically; that is; the subject 
of the study~ be it an organization or an 
individual, is not reduced to an isolated 
variable or to an hypothesis 1 but is viewed 
instead as a part of a whole. (4) 
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Each of these method-types has acquired a separate 
constituency of advocates who argue that it is their 
preferred methods that are best suited to evaluation. 
Campbell and Stanley (1966) and Riecken et aL (1974) 
are often cited as staunch proponents of quantitative 
methods. Although Campbell and Stanley were not primarily 
concerned with evaluation research, they describe the 
experiments as "the only way of establishing a cumulative 
tradition in which improvements can be introduced without 
the danger of a faddish discard of old wisdom in favour of 
inferior novel ties." ( 2) Riecken et al. ( 197 4) are only 
slightly more moderate in their claims about experiments 
and no less enthusiastic: "Experiments not only lead to 
clearer causal inferences, but the very process of 
experimental design helps to clarify the nature of the 
social problem being studied." (6,12) 
Among others, Weiss and Rein (1972), Partlett and 
Hamilton (1976), and Guba (1978) are firmly on the side of 
the debate supporting qualitative methods. In particular, 
Weiss and Rein (1972} suggest several alternative research 
strategies deriving from the qualitative tradition that 
they believe, "to be superior to experimental design as a 
methodology for evaluating broad-aim programs." (243) 
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Partlett and Hamilton (1976), speaking specifically of 
educational evaluation, note that: 
Characteristically, conventional approaches have 
followed the experimental and psychometric 
traditions dominant in educational research. 
Their aim of achieving fully "objective methods" 
has led to studies that are artificial and 
restricted in scope. We argue that such 
evaluations are inadequate for elucidating the 
complex problem areas they confront and, as a 
result, provide little effective input to the 
decision-making p,r_o_ce.s.s .... Illuminative research 
is introduced as belonging to a contrasting 
anthropological r-esearch paradigm {141) 
Similarly, Guba (1978) argues that naturalistic inquiry 
(which is likened to -ethnogr-aphic fi-eldwork) offers "a more 
congenial and responsive mode of evaluation than any other 
practiced today." (Bl) The current debate over .methods 
creates the impression that the researcher must not only 
choose a method Q.E;:caus-e of -allegiance to a para-dig1n, but 
must also choose between the qualitative and quantitative 
paradigms because those are the only choices available. 
The two paradigms come from two quite different and 
unique traditions. The composite of attributes that make 
up the quantitative paradigm grew out of the natural 
sciences, whereas the qualitative paradigm came from work 
in social anthropology and sociology. It is not clear why 
either of these separate traditions would be expected to 
provide an appropriate paradigm for evaluation research. 
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Fortunately, evaluators are not restricted to these two 
choices. 
Just because one conducts research in a holistic and 
naturalistic fashion, for example,.. does not mean that one 
must adhere to the other attributes of the qualitative 
paradigm, such as being exploratory and process-oriented. 
Rather, one could combine the naturalistic and holistic 
attributes from the qualitative paradigm with other 
attributes, such as being confirmatory and outcome-
oriented.., from the quantitative paradigm. 
In fact, all of the attributes that make up the 
paradigms are logically independent. Just as the methods 
are not logically linked to any of the paradigmatic 
attributes, the attributes themselves are not logically 
linked to each other. Thus, according to Reichardt and 
Cook (1979) "researchers should feel free to change their 
paradigmatic stance as the need arises ... a researcher's 
paradigmatic viewpoint should be flexible and adaptive. u 
(19) Moreover, they maintain that in using a combination of 
qtlali tati ve and quantitativ-e methods in att-acking 
evaluation problems, two clear and distinct benefits 
emerge. First, when used together for the same purpose, the 
two method-types can build upon each other to offer 
insights that neither one alone could provide. And second, 
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because all methods have biases, only by using multiple 
techniques can the researcher triangulate on the underlying 
truth. Since quantitative and qualitative methods often 
have different biases, ~ach can be used to ~he~k -on and 
learn from the other. 
4 . 1 INTERVIEWS with. OFFSHORE SECTOR PERSONNEL 
4.11 Sample and Setting 
The participants in this study were selected from a 
group of fishers i;:hat, presently or in the past, nave 
fished in the offshore groundfish sector. Most interviews 
were with offshore vessel captains, although several 
industry managers were interviewed in hopes that they would 
provide an insightful perspective. All participants in thi-s 
study have at least six years of experience in the offshore 
sector. Interviews were conducted during a three month 
period -- October to December 1996 -- in numerous cities 
and towns across Nova Scotia: Lll>."lenburg, Liverpool, 
Louisbourg, Canso, and Petite de Grate. 
4.12 Selection of lntervi~s 
The researcher and the thesis supervisor contacted Mr. 
Mike O'Connor of National Sea Products Ltd. to obtain a 
list of management and trawler captains who have worked or 
presently are working in the offshore groundfish fishery. 
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This required the presentation of a synopsis of the 
research proposal by the researcher, outlining the purpose 
of the inquiry; how anonymity of those interviewed would be 
guaranteed and the approximate duration of the information 
gathering phase. After a brief discussion about the 
research proposal, Mr. O'Connor provided the researcher 
with a list of seven active trawler captains, and a 
telephone number at which they could be contacted. 
Working from personal recommendations by the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Marine Fish Division, a 
list of ten retired, and inactive offshore personnel was 
generated. The remaining interviewees were selected by a 
"snowball sample" method that Creed (1996) deliberately 
chose for her interview survey. In a snowball sample 
procedure, interviewees are asked to provide additional 
names that they feel would be interested to taking part in 
the study. (Babbie 1986) All prospective interviewees were 
personally contacted by the researcher and informed in 
detail of the nature of the project. And after do so, only 
one (retired captain) prospective interviewee declined to 
be interviewed. In the end, those interviewed were as 
follows: 
e 7 active offshore captains 
o 2 inactive offshore captains 
o 7 retired offshore captains 
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• 3 inactive offshore captains, now active inshore 
fishers 
• 2 shore captains 
• 4 industry managers 
The possibility of including crew-members in the interview 
phase was considered but it was decided that their 
knowledge of discarding and misreporting practices would 
lack the detail necessary for this study. 
4.13 Interview Protocol 
The interviews themselves were conducted by the 
author, either in the interviewee's home or (for the some 
of the active offshore fishery personnel) in the offices of 
National Sea Products in Lunenburg. To those that agreed to 
participate, it was stressed that while they had consented, 
the interviews were voluntary, and they could withdraw at 
any time, before the interview or at and point during the 
interview. 
Interviews were conducted following the general 
structure of an "open-ended topical" format as suggested in 
Patton (1980). In dealing with a similar target group, 
Creed (1996) used this "free-form" interview format with 
few if any standard questions, which she claims is a better 
approach for gathering sensitive information (as reports of 
discarding and misreporting certainly are) . A list of 
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general topics was consequently brought into the interview 
setting and more particular questions evolved during the 
process of the interview. There were similarities among 
interviews due to the topical headings, but also much 
diversity because some questions were based on discussions 
or stories offered by each respondent. Indeed, much of the 
most interesting information from a more structured 
interview format often comes from impromptu discussions of 
matters that had not been anticipated by any formal 
questions. In essence, both parties determined the ultimate 
direction of the interview, the particular questions 
answered, and the length of time given to each topic or 
issue. 
Individual interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 2 
hours. Although all the interviews were open-ended 
discussions, there were some set questions used to gather 
career-related information; for example, years fished in 
the offshore sector, years fished as a captain in the 
offshore 1 other sectors fished. Further, there were other 
set questions sometimes used to assist interviewees in 
describing causal factors that contributed to misreporting 
and discarding; discuss specific kinds of unconservative 
fishing, and suggest ways in which these behaviours might 
be curtailed in the future. 
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4.14 Ethical Considerations 
The rights and integrity of human subjects were 
respected, and ano:nyro.i ty was provided upon request. All 
interviews were conducted under a strict set of rules and 
procedures. Each interview began by asking permission to 
tape record the session. Of the 26 interviews, only one 
asked that the ent~re interview not be recorded, and two 
interviews could not be recorded due to their public 
location. At any point during the interview, the subject 
could request the tape recorder be turned off or specify 
certain information be placed off-the-record. This 
occurred on one occasion only. Further, at the beginning, 
and at the end 0f each interview, the subject was 
informed that they could be provided with a verbatim 
transcript of the interview. If requested, the subject 
could make any corrections, clarifications, additions, or 
deletions in the dialogue that he/she felt were 
necessary. Any published quotations or references to 
information acquired during the interviews would be from 
these self-edited transcripts. Of those interviewed, 
three requested a transcription of their interview, 
however, after reviewing their transcript, they decided 
not make any changes in the dialogue. This method is 
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similar to the interview protocol used by Finlayson 
(1994) with equally sensitive information and opinions. 
These precautions and guarantees are appropriate given 
the controversial nature of the subject, the potential 
sensitivity of some of the information and opinions 
offered during the interviews, and the vulnerability of 
some of the subjects to -- possibly quite serious 
repercussions. 
4.2 COLLECTION and ANALYSIS of DISCARDING DATA 
Programs of face-to-face -interviews, supported by an 
interviewer completed questionnaire to collect quantitative 
data, have proven successful in gathering a variety o.f 
types of data from Maritime fishers (Kenchington & Halliday 
1994) However, this general approach was not adopted. 
Instead, the necessary quantitative data on historical 
fishing practices were collected in two ways; by comparing 
the discard rate on observed and non-observed trips; and 
analysing recorded discards by calculating a variance in 
length frequency at sea (observer length samples) and on 
land (DFO port sampling program) . 
Beginning in 1984, captains in the offshore groundfish 
sector were requif:'ed by law, on a set by set basis, to 
record in their vessel logbooks, all discarded biomass--by 
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species and weight. However, these discards were never 
entered into the DFO statistical database. The original 
logbooks were obtained from government archives and 
processed. The following data were extracted (years 1980-
1990): year of trip, date of trip, vessel na"'Il.e, vessel 
captain, area fished, and discarded fish (by species and 
weight) . After all discards were recorded into the data 
base, each vessel trip was cross referenced with the vessel 
observer data base to determine if the recorded discards on 
observed trips were greater than on non-observed trips. If 
there were more recorded discards on observed trips, it can 
be inferred that on non-observed trips, some discards were 
not recorded. Further, recorded discards on observed trips 
were checked to see if they correspond with the observer 
trip reports. Unfortunately, significant parts of these 
records are highly suspect or even known to be misleading, 
and the actual magnitude of the errors is not known. 
Several of those interviewed reported that the true numbers 
of discards were never recorded in the vessel logbook. 
Further~ it was not until the late 1980's that many of the 
captains began to accurately record discarded fish. 
In the final phase of the research, using length 
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frequency statistics collected at sea22 and on land, 23 
observed and non-observed trips were compared to see if 
observed trips were resulting in higher levels of small 
fish. If this was detected, then, it could be inferred that 
small fish were being discarded in favour of larger, more 
profitable fish on the non-observed trips. The variance in 
length frequency data between observed and non-observed 
trips would be a strong indicator of how much discarding 
has taken place. 24 
The difficulties in calculating the amounts of 
commercial fish discarded at sea are well known. Likewise, 
those conducting stock assessments tolerate with reluctance 
continually having to account for deficiencies in data. 
Even when there was an observer on the vessel, calculating 
discards traditionally depended on estimating the total 
weight of either discards or gross catch. It would be 
reasonable to assume that only when catches were small will 
crews have the time to put all discards in boxes of which 
22 If an observer is onboard, they are required to collect length 
frequency data on a set by set basis. In other words, while the 
crew are processing fish, the observer is required take a length 
frequency of a random sample of fish. 
23 The DFO has established a dockside-monitoring program to take 
length frequency sample of catches of offshore vessels. 
24 Arnason (1993) estimates the discard rate in the icelandic 
offshore groundfish fishery (ITQ) to be 8 to 10%. He reported 
that this statistic was calculated by determining the variance in 
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some would be weighed and the total n~~er counted to 
generate an estimate of total discarded material. 25 Where 
this is impossible, the captain or delegate might estimate 
the quantity of fish in the catch (based on the number of 
boxes) , and make an estimate of fish discarded based upon 
the amount kept. Using this method, it is reasonable to 
assuro.e that discards would be frequently underestimated. 
The advantages 1Jf -calculating quanti ties of discards 
from length frequencies of fish caught, and landed are 
obvious; this methDdology can be used to check on the spot 
estimates, and it can be used when large volume of catch 
make accurate discard estimates impractical Dr impossible. 
The matching of length frequency distributions of 
catch landings over a totally recruited length range, and 
those of catch and discards over one totally unrecruited 
could permit an estimate of discards to be made in both 
n~rabers and weight of discards corresponding to a given 
weight of catch. OHllis 1979, 1981). 
This method requires that a scaleable factor (discard 
length frequency data from observed and non-observed trips 
(pers. comm.) . 
25 As the fish were processed, small, damaged, or non-commercial 
fish were discarded through the discard hatch (skuppers, 
grinders) that were adjacent to the processing line. After all 
the fish were processed, the captain was provided with an 
estimate of retained and discarded fish (based on the number of 
boxes filled) . 
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multiplier) be determined by which a sample of discards can 
be adjusted based on the length frequencies of reported 
catch. 
X = log (L + (D * F) /C) 
= log (L + (D * F) - log c 
where c = number of fish in catch sample 
L = number of fish in landing sample 
D = number of fish in discards sample 
F = variable scalable factor which is 
used as a multiplier for D. 
63 
CHAPTER 5 
HISTORICAL FISHING BEHAVIOUR 1983-1993 
Enforcement is a critical issue in any management 
regime. Quota based systems, in particular, offer numerous 
opportunities for rule evasion. Most evasion occurs in the 
masking of actual fishing effort in altered logbooks and 
catch records. Several researchers have noted that most 
captains, at one point or another, have misreported 
landings (Wilson 1994, Schiochetti 1994) • Misreporting of 
landings, most often, has focused misreporting species 
landed by area fished; however, there have been reported 
cases where companies misreported species landed26 • This 
behaviour creates a serious problem for fisheries managers 
that require reasonably accurate report - species specific 
- on catch and effort from vessel operators as a basis for 
their estimation of stock strengths and optimal 
exploitation rates. 
5 . 1 PAPER FISH 
Misreporting of species landed by area fished seems to 
vary in frequency across time from "occasionally'' to 
"everytime you had the chance to." With the exception of 
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one captain that was interviewed, all admitted that at one 
time or another, they had misreported catches by area 
fished. When asked about the extent of this fishing 
behaviour, some said the practice had ended by 1987 while 
others said that it extended into the early 1990's. For all 
the captains interviewed, misreporting catch was perceived 
an occupational hazard that was necessary and could not be 
avoided. 
Several of the interviewees placed the blame for this 
behaviour on the company but the rest consistently stated 
that it occurred when quota areas and fish abundance were 
not congruent. For example, there were fish in one area 
where the boats had little or no quota and quotas in 
another where there were no fish (paper fish) . As several 
stated, there was then no other way to make a trip than to 
misreport. 
See you run into situations where that in some 
areas during some parts of the year, we'd have a 
shortage of fish. In order to get your trip of 
fish, we'd have to manipulate the areas and the 
numbers so that we could match the fish with the 
area we'd have quota in. Nobody was getting the 
right picture of what was going on. 
It was just accepted. You had to do it 
[misreport] to survive. Ar1d if you didn't do it, 
26 This occurred before a comprehensive dockside-monitoring 
program was instituted to curb such behaviour. 
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there were ten guys behind you waiting behind you 
for your job. 
An offshore captain with more than 20 years experience 
said: 
Whenever there was room to do it, it would be 
done. Whether it is less steam time, whether it 
is for bigger fish, a lot of it was for bigger 
fish. Like if you could catch bigger fish in one 
area, and record it in the other area well then, 
it's just, you know it had to be done. Catch the 
bigger fish you went wherever you could get them, 
sometimes it didn't even matter if you had quota 
there. 
On occasions, all or most of a catch was reported to areas 
that were barely fished during that trip. 
We'd be allor-1ed say 200,000 lbs. of Yellowtails, 
25,000 from the Grand Banks and rest from quereau 
[Bankquereau Bank]. If we had 8 or 9 days, we'd 
probably spend 6 of them on the Grand Banks, and 
spend maybe a day or a day and a half, never over 
2 days on quereau. If you had your 200,000 
Yellowtails, you'd mark 20,000 or 25,000 for the 
Grand Banks, and the rest to quereau. 
Certain areas experienced more misreporting than 
others, leading to landings data for some species being 
higher than the reported catches in these areas. These 
areas are as follows: 
o 3Ps redfish reported as 4Vn. 
o 30 cod and yellowtail reported as 4Vs in the early 
1990's. 
o 4Vn cod reported as 4Vs. 
e 3P cod and flounder reported as 4Vs and 4Vn. 
66 
It was reported that by the early 1990's, the extent of 
misreporting in several areas had resulted in what 
fisheries managers called "paper fish" maintaining a 
catch history in an area that experienced an extensive 
amount of misreporting. In other words, over-fishing had 
resulted in the reduction of a stock such that an 
enterprise could not catch their quota in that area. 
Instead, they resorted to catching fish in another area and 
assigning them to the area in which they had a q'J.ota for 
that species. 
Another less common form of misreporting is what 
several captains called "stealing fish". This could occur 
in two ways: catching fish in areas where you do not have 
quota, usually done under the cover of darkness; and 
requesting a small amount of quota in an area where the 
captain knew he could catch fish and report them to another 
area. In this situation, if the captain was boarded by a 
DFO patrol vessel or spotted by aerial surveillance, he 
would be justified in fishing that area. 
I think everybody knew what was going on, I don't 
mean everybody, but the company knew what was 
going on. They might turn a blind eye now, but 
they had to know what was going on. For instance, 
if you were in 4Vs, they'd probably give you 
25,000 to catch in 4Vn, just enough to get you in 
that area, then they'd say you were allowed 
200,000 in 4Vs, it was just enough to get you in 
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the other area. They knew that we could fish for 
a month and not get 200,000 in 4Vs. 
If the company had a lot of cod quota in 4Vs, and 
not so much in 4Vn. They (company) would give us 
this piece of paper telling us what we were 
allowed to catch and we were allowed to catch it. 
They rr1ould give you say 100,000 of cod in 4Vs, 
10,000 from 4Vn and 10,000 or so from the Grand 
Banks. We'd spend a couple of days in each area, 
and if we didn't get anything, we'd head out to 
the Grand Banks. v/e'd get a catch of fish from 
there, and come back up on Quereau (4Vs) and 
report that we caught them there. We caught loads 
of fish this way. 
Aerial surveillance, which was supposed to prevent 
this practice, was easily evaded by keeping logbooks two or 
more days in arrears. The boat's true position could be 
reported whenever the plane flew over and the logbook 
completed as showing that the boat had steamed from 
wherever she was supposed to be to where she was sighted 
during two or more day reserve period. 
5.2 DISCARDING and HIGHGRADING 
Discarding of fish by the domestic fishing fleets of 
Canada's East Coast has been a long-standing problem. 
Historically, most people in the fishing industry felt that 
the percentages of the total catch discarded were 
insignificant, and unlikely to affect fish stocks 
dramatically. The ongoing crisis in the groundfishery has 
forced us to reassess this assumption. 
68 
On many occasions, company and fishing regulations 
contributed to the frequency of discarding. In 1988, the 
province of Nova Scotia introduced a minimum fish size 
requirement. Fishers and fishing companies were prohibited 
from landing cod, haddock 1 and pollock smaller than 41 em 
in length. Thus, any fish too small to land was required to 
be "thrown back". Further, it has long been held that some 
companies provided their captains with a "shopping list" of 
species required. Along with it went a clear threat of non-
payment, suspension or replacement if he/she did not 
comply. Under these conditions 1 it can be expected that a 
captain will discard any species over and above the 
recommended mix. 27 
We did what we had to do to get a load of fish, 
and land the required mix of species, and size. 
Because we knew that if we didn't do it, there 
would be plenty of people waiting to fill our 
shoes. The company made that quite clear. 
We was on a pollack trip to LaHave bank, I shot 
away and made a short tow. When we hauled back, 
we had 50,000 of haddock. I didn't know what to 
do with them. We call the Department of Fisheries 
and Ocean, they said that I couldn't land them or 
else I'd be fined. So what are you going to do? I 
just dumped them. After that all hell breaks 
loose when the papers hear that we're dumping all 
27 Before each trip, companies provided their captains with 
specific a fishing plan that is expressed in terms of 
directed species, areas to be fished, and quantities to be 
caught. The purpose of the fishing plan is to match fish 
availability with market demand and processing capacity. 
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this fish. So, the department decides that now 
you're not allowed to catch them. First you 
weren't allowed to land them, which was stupid. 
Now you can't catch them. From that point on, all 
discarding went underground. There was no way I 
was going to write down anything in my logbook 
that they could come back and charge me with. 
They'd [company] say to you, you have to catch so 
many pounds of fish from this area, so many 
pounds from that area, and you can have a 100,000 
codfish if you can get them 22 inches and up. 
You know, so what are you going to do? If you can 
get the 100,000 of codfish, you're going to take 
them. And if you happened to kill say for that 
100,000, you happened to kill 500,000 catching 
them, well it was never even thought about, it 
was just normal procedure. 
During this period (1983-93) 1 fish size limits 
affected the frequency of discarding behaviour. 28 The price 
paid to captains for their catch was dependent upon the 
size as well as the quality of the fish landed. Processing 
small fish was labour intensive and the resulting product 
fetches a low market value. Consequently, companies set 
minimum size standards. Thus, all fish below the minimum 
were likely to be removed {highgrading) . 
Take for example the codfish in 4Vn, we'd go in 
there and get little fish 12 - 14 inches long, 
company didn't want them. We'd get suspended if 
we brought them in. If we went there to get 
bigger fish then we had to throw those the little 
ones away. You had to fish under the orders you 
were given, but if you didn't do it, someone else 
would do it. 
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Using an analogy, an insightful captain succinctly 
described one of the reasons why highgrading had occurred: 
The problem was that there were so much mixed 
fish out there. With small fish, they were harder 
to process and you would less money for them ... 
Let's put it this vtay, you got a big field of 
apples out there. You got big apples that bring 
you lots of money and you can sell them all. And 
you got small apples that bring you less money, 
and you can't sell them all because nobody wants 
them. What are you going to do? You're going to 
bring in those big apples, ain't you. I'm not 
saying it was right, but that's what we had to 
do, and that is what happened. 
Some areas, those possessing higher concentrations of 
small fish experi€nced more discarding than others. At 
certain times of the year, many of these areas were 
reported to have discard rates in excess of 50%, whereas in 
other areas, the discard rate hovered around 15-20%. 29 
Further adding to the problem for management, many of the 
captains interviewed stated that from the early to mid 
1980's, very little, if any, discarding was reported 
accurately, and that many if not most log entries would be 
highly suspect. The true nurnbers of discards were never 
recorded in the vessel logbook, and the actual magnitude of 
the errors will never be precisely known. 
29 This statistic is based upon estimates by interviewees of 
discard rates in some areas. 
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I'd say the first 4 or 5 years of the EA program 
from '83 to '86, you'd have a big problem, all of 
that information is not really accurate. But from 
say '88 on it's bang-on. 
As far as reporting discards, terrible. I mean I 
never told the fuckers the truth, and they'd know 
it you know. Well, I mean, nowadays, I think, 
you're getting good information, from us guys, 
the offshore. 
5. 3 ANALYSIS of LOGBOOK DATA 
In 1984, DFO mandated that all offshore groundfish 
captains were requ.i:j:'ed to record in their vessel logbooks 
all discarded biomass by species and weight. Most 
captains freely admitted that these records are erroneous 
and misleading. However, if the logbooks were compared to 
the observer data base and observer trip reports, it 
potentially could shed some light on the discarding issue. 
The analysis of logbook records has followed several 
lines of investigation. After all discards were recorded 
into the data base, each vessel trip was cross referenced 
with the vessel observer data base to determine if the 
recorded discards on observed trips were greater than on 
non-observed trips. If there were more recorded discards on 
observed trips, it can be inferred that on non-observed 
trips, some discards were not recorded. Further, recorded 
discards on observed trips were checked to see if they 
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correspond with the observer trip reports. The results are 
summarized in Table 1. I£ there were more recorded discards 
on observed trips, it can be inferred that on non-observed 
trips, some discards were not recorded. 
In Table la, (see appendix 2) catch rates for cod have 
consistently been two times higher when observers are on 
present (highlighted in red) . Although we can only 
speculate, the lower catch rate on non-observed trips may 
potentially reflect a significant amount of discarding on 
non-observed trips. Although Haddock and Flounder are quite 
variable, there has been a reasonable agreement in catch 
rates across time (highlighted in blue) . Landings based on 
trip weightouts have generally been in agreement with 
observers at sea estimates of retained catches (see Table 
lb in Appendix 3). This shows that there is some congruency 
between the amount of catch actually landed and what 
observers estimated was retained. Further, that observer 
estimates of discards are relatively accurate. 
In Table lc (in Appendix 4), the observer estimated 
discard rates are listed by year and species. Haddock and 
flounder rates seem to fluctuate from year to year. Cod 
discards, however, show a steady increase from 1% to 4%. Up 
until the late 1980's, only 20-25% of all offshore trips 
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were observed. Thus, it is possible that actual discard 
rates could be 3 to 4 times higher than estimated. 
In examining discard data from the years 1984-1990, 
there seems to be some variance in recorded discards on 
observed trips vs. non-observed trips (Table 2a in Appendix 
5). We see that in most cases 1 the reported discards on 
observed trips are larger than that of non-observed trips. 
This suggests that there may have been some change in 
fishing behaviour with an observer on-board. There is a 
greater chance that the captain recorded discarded fish on 
an observed trip than non-observed trip. 
If we pay particular attention to documented discards 
of the most valuable commercial species after 1989 - the 
years alleged to be the most accurate as suggested in the 
interview data (Table 2b in Appendix 6) . 80% of all 
reported discards of cod and 8 6% of all redfish discards 
occurred on observed trips. Similarly, in 1989 76% of cod 
and 78% of haddock recorded discards occurred on observed 
trips. Clearly there is a pattern of recorded discards in 
the later years of this study. However, these findings were 
not consistent in the early years of the study. 
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5.4 LENGTH FREQUENCY ANALYSIS 
In the final phase of the research, length frequency 
statistics collected at sea30 and on land, 31 observed and 
non-observed trips were used to compare to see if observed 
trips were resulting in higher levels of small fish. If 
this was detected, then, it might reasonably be inferred 
that small fish were being discarded in favour of larger, 
more profitable fish on the non-observed trips. The 
variance in length frequency data between observed and non-
observed and analysing recorded discards by calculating a 
variance in length frequency at sea (observer length 
samples) and on land (DFO port sampling program} would be a 
strong indicator of how much discarding has taken place. 32 
This method required a simple logarithm to calculate a 
scaleable factor or discard multiplier that can be used to 
adjusted length frequencies of reported catch at sea and on 
land. X log (L + (D * F) /C) 
= log (L + (D * F) - log C 
30 If an observer is onboard, they are required to collect length 
frequency data on a set by set basis. In other words, while the 
crew are processing fish, the observer is required take a length 
frequency of a random sample of fish. 
31 The DFO has established a dockside-monitoring program to take 
length frequency sample of catches of offshore vessels. 
32 Arnason (1993) estimates the discard rate in the Icelandic 
offshore groundfish fishery (ITQ) to be 8 to 10%. He reported 
that this statistic was calculated by determining the variance in 
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where c nw:nber of fish in catch sample 
L nw:nber of fish in landing sample 
D :::::: nw:nber of fish in discards sa."'llple 
F = variable scalable factor which is 
used as a multiplier for D. 
Unfortunately, length frequency analysis failed to 
detect if smaller, less valuable fish were being discarded 
in favour of larger, more valuable fish. In most cases, the 
observer saw fewer smaller, and hence likely to be 
discarded fish than were actually seen in shore based 
samples. The only possible inference that can be made in 
the situation is that the presence of an observer has a 
significant on fishing practices. With an observer onboard, 
captains were able to avoid small fish, and possibility of 
having to discard them. If we examine the fall cod fishery 
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in 4Vs, there is some evidence of "missing fish". However, 
the pattern is not consistent across time. 
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The evidence is similar for the winter fishery in 4Vs 
with very little, if any, "missing fishu showing up. 
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In summary, assigning enterprise quota rights a 
right to harvest a certain quantity of fish should 
encourage the holder to cooperate in resource management by 
clearly defining shares in the current catch and in all 
potential yields. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that 
quota holders have a strong incentive to support 
sustainable fishing practices, and stock enhancement. 
This chapter examined fishing practices across time to 
determine if those prosecuting this fishery were doing so 
in a conservative manner. Interview data revealed a 
consensus &"'!long those interviewed that misreporting catch 
was a regular occurrence that was encouraged by management. 
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Discarding data and length frequency data did hold some 
promise to help accurat~ly quantify a level of discarding. 
However, any evidence of discarding was inconsistent across 
time. Thus, any conclusions were impossible. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter briefly summarizes findings regarding 
regulatory compliance, outlines an emergent company plan to 
address issues examined in the thesis, and makes 
recommendations for important future research directions 
including a case for multi-method co-operatively based 
methodologies. 
6.1 FINDINGS 
The thesis has explored responses of those in the 
offshore groundfish sector to a new property right-based 
fisheries regime -- Individual Quotas (IQs) and Individual 
Transferable Quotas (ITQs} in a region of Atlantic Canada. 
More specifically, issues of discarding unwanted fish in 
the course of normal fishing effort, and misreporting of 
species by area caught are investigated. Discarding has 
been suggested as one of, if not, the most critical 
compliance behaviour issues critical to the new management 
regime. Interview data found little evidence of willful 
discarding of commercial species that possessed monetary 
value. Discarding seemed to be the last option for fishers 
trying to work under regulatory conditions that were 
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perceived to be dramatically different from past practices. 
This is not to inf€r that discarding of commercial species 
did not take place. Indeed, at certain times and places, it 
was/is extremely high as freely a~,itted by many fishers. 
Discarding seemed a major issue where and when 
regulatory and economic pressures served to restrict 
options. The most identifiable instance of this was when 
fishers were presented with a "shopping list" of species, 
quantity, quality, and length required by their by his/her 
employer. Fishers commonly reported that when faced with 
such constraints they frequently discarded any and all 
species not on that list. Further, Federal and provincial 
fishing regulations contributed to the discarding problem. 
DFO regulations were allowing fishers to use nets with mesh 
sizes small enough to catch undersized fish. The province 
of Nova Scotia introduced a minimum fish size requirement 
that prohibited fishers from landing cod, haddock, and 
pollock smaller than 41 em in length. 
DFO logbook analysis provided some insight on past 
fishing practicess in that some evidence of discarding on 
non-observed trip was detected. The use of qualitative 
information through semi-structured interviews determined 
that the majority of the logbook records were erroneous. 
This analysis underscores the advantage of using several 
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different methods (both qualitative and quantitative) to 
investigate fishing practices. lUthough the length 
frequency analysis did not detect the expected "missing 
fish", it did determine that captains fished more 
conservatively when an observer was aboard. This suggested 
that they were able to avoid small fish or fishing in areas 
where there were concentrations of small fish. This 
suggests very clearly that skippers could in the absence of 
countervailing pressure from employer or other sources 
avoid discarding relatively easily. 
Misreporting was also found to be widespread and 
response to similar conditions. Misreporting can take many 
forms of which arguably the most important is creating 
"paper fish" or maintaining a catch history in an area that 
experienced an extensive amount of misreporting. In other 
words 1 over-fishing resulted in the reduction of a stock 
such that an enterprise could not catch their quota in that 
area. Instead, they resorted to catching fish in another 
area and assigning them to the area in which they had a 
quota for that species. Such a practice did not carry that 
moral stigma as discarding because it did not result in 
more killed fish but merely shuffling of catch histories 
from area to area. Thusr it was a more accepted form of 
fishing practice. Most of the captains interviewed stated 
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that misreporting was a daily occurrence, and a necessary 
practice in order to catch the required species, in the 
correct amounts, at the appropriate time. 
The ecological sustainability of our ocean fisheries 
is a major challenge for fisheries managers in the Scotia-
Fundy region as well as worldwide. To meet this challenge 1 
policy makers must find new and innovative ways to 
influence fishing behaviour. In interviews with fisheries 
managers, several suggested a more instrumental approach. 
They argued that people are driven by self-interest alone, 
that compliance is determined by the certainty and severity 
of the sanction in the event of violation of the rules. 
This is sometimes called the "deterrence" or the "big 
stick" approach. 
I feel that the only way to conserve fish stocks 
is to set an accepted level of mortality, then 
guard that with your life. Make the punishment 
for getting caught a sufficient deterrent, see to 
it that they loose their quota or license, only 
then vlill fishermen respect the industry. To do 
that you must put observers on all vessels. 
Past experience suggests that this orientation was/is 
relatively ineffective due to the low level of acceptance 
by the fishing community (including -fishing companies), and 
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the ingenuity of fishers to find new and innovative ways to 
circumvent the regulations. 
An alternative to the deterrence approach exists. 
Termed the 
centrality 
participation 
regulations. 
normative 
of fisher 
in and 
perspective, it 
and 
the 
corporate 
acceptance 
stresses the 
understanding, 
of fisheries 
It is predicated upon the belief that 
regulated parties will comply with rules they believe are 
fair and reasonable, and that are being administered in a 
fair and reasonable manner. (McKinlay and Millington 1999). 
It underscores the widely accepted premise that serious 
consideration must be given to the human dimension of 
managing fisheries. In this view, effective fisheries 
management is primarily about managing people, individually 
as well as in their corporate form. It is about influencing 
behaviour to co-operatively achieve sustainability for 
fisheries and the communities that depend upon them. 
Simply, the most brilliantly designed management system 
will fail on the water unless the fishers working within it 
endorse the spirit of the system, are prepared to obey the 
rules that support it and do not encounter significant 
conflicts and tensions between such adherence and other 
economic and/or political pressures placed upon them 
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through their employment. Legitimation is the critical 
keystone for achieving the highest levels of compliance. 
Interview data from the Scotia-Fundy groundfishery 
reinforces this latter orientation, that a more co-
management based approach is needed. Fisheries stakeholders 
(companies and their employees) must be part of the 
management equation. People are much more likely to buy 
into a system when they see it as having legitimacy in 
terms of outcome and process. The key to achieving this 
legitimacy is with stakeholder participation in the 
development and operation of the whole fisheries management 
process. 
To work in practiceu the rules of the management 
system and the services that support the system must be 
developed and operated in collaboration with the regulated 
corr~unity and the other relevant stakeholders. In the 
future, fisheries managers must strive to forge strong 
working relationships with all fisheries stakeholders. 
Particular emphasis has to be given to the relationship 
with those who hav€ the rights to harvest fish - rights or 
quota holders. It is this group who have the incentive to 
protect the resource. They must be encouraged to 
participate in all fisheries management processes, 
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including planning, research, and compliance strategy 
development and the delivery of fisheries services. 
6.3 Local Attempts at More Cooperative Management 
Some initial movement in this direction is now 
occurring. National Sea Products was the first fishing 
company in the domestic offshore groundfish sector to take 
steps towards promoting the evolution of a conservation 
ethic. With the creation and implementation of its new 
Fisheries Compliance Policy, their goal is to achieve a 
sustainable level of resource exploitation and to ensure 
harvesting is performed in a responsible and conservative 
manner in compliance with all regulatory requirements. At 
least implicitly, this policy addresses issue of discarding 
and misreporting which are the foci of this thesis. A key 
consideration will be whether this new policy becomes truly 
and comprehensively integrated into both employee as well 
as corporate behaviour. 
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Table 3 
The key components of the Compliance Policy 
Land-it-all Policy Unless otherwise instructed, 
vessel captains are required 
, to land all of the fish I captured during their trip. 
At-sea monitoring 1 100% observer 
!monitoring and 
and video i 
electronic 
! logs 
Shore captain inspection I Boat is inspected pre and 
!post sailing by the shore 
captain 
Gathering of Scientific j Gathering catch data such as 
Information 
Small fish protocol 
random length I measurements frequency 
If a catch has 10% small fish 
in two consecutive tows, a I captain is required to leave 
the area he is fishing 
This compliance policy seems to be accepted favourably 
by the employees int€rviewed for this study; they feel it 
may reduce destructive harvesting policies onboard. 
The crews, I think they like the compliance 
policy too because they know too where their 
limits, and it's good for everybody really. 
If I go in an shoot away and get some codfish, 
and I put it in my logbook, which I did, maybe 
somebody would question me on it, but if an 
observerws there and he writes in, oh yeah, he's 
seen somebody else got codfish, he tried to avoid 
it. There's nothing to do when it does that. 
You know, it's accidental catch. But I'm sure if 
you never had an observer, you know and come in 
with some codfish, they could question you. I 
don't think that's right. 
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6.4 Consideration~ -for -Futw:e Research 
The qualitative/quantitative methodology proved very 
successful in researching the complex and subtle behaviours 
and attitudes underlying resource management change. Each 
method provided valuable and insightful understanding 
independently but when combined and integrated, were able 
to shed much more light fishing behaviour that exists in 
the shadows. 
The possibility of including crew-members in the 
interview phase of the research was considered. But it was 
decided that their knowledge of discarding and misreporting 
practices would lack the detail necessary for this study. I 
would suggest that any future research include crew-members 
for their knowledge of these behaviours can be checked 
against observer~ and logbook records. 
It would be very interesting and valuable to do an 
ongoing case study of this fishing sector and determine 
whether the new regulatory regime and its underlying 
assu...'Il.ptions have become part of the corporate culture of 
the companies fishing in the offshore sector. There are 
several questions left unanswered: if stocks recover, will 
these companies give into market pressures, and return to 
fishing as they have in the past? Are fishers more likely 
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to violate fishing rules in times of abundance? Is there a 
positive correlation between catch per unit effort (CPUE) 
ratio and average rate of discarding? A case study of this 
fishery could determine if this new ethic of conservation 
has permeated all levels of the fishing industry - from 
company management to deckhands. 
6.5 Final Notes 
Over 70% of major world fish population are 
overexploited or approaching maximum exploitation 
(Cochrane, 1999) . Experience from the past 20 years 
suggests that imposed fishing regulations do not work. This 
thesis addresses the key components as we move toward a 
rights-based fishing regime, issues of rule avoidance 
discarding and misreporting are critical. It is an 
important contribution that which drives rule vio.lation. 
Through understanding, we can develop a regulatory regime 
to decrease it. 
The thesis has shown that captains have the ability 
and knowledge to avoid these practices, but a combination 
of personal greed and employer pressure led them to violate 
regulations without fully appreciating long-term 
consequences of their actions. It is hoped that with 
understanding sustainable fishing and participating in an 
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effective, co-operatively based fisheries management 
system, a system can be developed which simultaneously 
conserves fish stock while allowing families, and 
communities dependent on such resources to survive and 
thrive. 
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Appendix 1 
Interview questions for participants in the indust~ 
1. Background Informati~n 
o How many years have you been fishing? 
o How many years have you fished under an EA management 
system? 
Of those years, specify what positions you held in 
relation to 
the boat you were working on? 
2. Relationship between the skippers and their parent 
companies. 
o How did this relationship influence past fishing 
practices? Did this relationship influence on the amount 
of discarding and misreporting? 
o How did the system of payment and boat bonuses influence 
the 
way you fished? 
o Has this relationship changed in recent years? 
If so, in what way has it changed? 
3. Actual Fishing Practices 
To this point, most of the information that has been 
gathered and doct:L."llented on the offshore sector is 
speculative and anecdotal; Skipper A heard from one of his 
crew that Skipper B discarded X many lbs. of cod in 4Vs ... 
The purpose of these interviews is to seek the truth about 
what actually happened, why it happened, and how it can 
prevented from happening in the future if and when all 
fisheries are re-opened .. 
o Did you at anytime use undersized mesh, cod-end liners, 
or 
tension belts or in the case of Longliners, use smaller 
than 
regulation hooks, and/or small bait size ? 
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If yes, how often? 
o Did you continue to fish an area when previous sets were 
resulting in high quanti ties of small fish and/ or by-
catch? 
o Given that discarding was not illegal or immoral for that 
matter, did you make it a habit of recording all 
discards (by weight and species) in your vessel log? 
o If not, can you provide an estimate (in a percentage of 
an 
average trip catch) of how much was discarded without 
being recorded (specify species and areas}? 
o What was the most common reason for discarding? (For 
example, 
below legal size to land, damaged or of poor quality, 
size not requested by the fish plant or owners, 
highgraded to fill quota with large fish, exceeded target 
or bycatch trip limits .. ) 
o Did you misreport catch by area? 
If so, what areas {and the corresponding species) did you 
most frequently misreport? 
o Did you fish any differently when a DFO observer was on-
board? If yes, in what way? 
a Have these practices changes? 
If so, in what way have they changed and why have they 
changed? (For example.. you realize that discarding and 
misreporting can have an adverse affect on groundfish 
stocks, company policy does not allow such practices to 
occur .. ) 
4. The Offshore Groundfish Fishery in the Future 
Making the ass~~ption that there has been a change in 
the conservation ethic, it begs some important 
(sociological) questions: What or who has been the impetus 
or driving force behind these changes? Has it been 
companies concerned about their share the future groundfish 
stocks (which, in theory, should result from a quasi-rights 
based fishing regi~e)? Is it merely a knee-jerk response to 
the present state of the industry? If and when the 
groundfish stocks return healthy and sustainable levels and 
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the fishery is reopened, will companies continue to fish as 
they have in the past (old habits are hard to break)? 
Sociologically, these are key questions to answer because 
who initiates the change is just as important as the change 
itself. It is essential for the future of the fishery that 
we get some idea if, and to what extent this ethic of 
conservation has been internalized by all those in the 
industry (not just company management) . 
o How has new DFO policy (increased mesh size, dockside 
monitoring, 100% observer coverage) affected your ability 
to fish profitably? 
o Do you agree that these measures are necessary to insure 
a sustainable fishery? 
o If the fishery were to reopen tomorrow, and groundfish 
stocks were at healthy levels, would you fish any 
differently than you did in the past? If yes, what sort 
of changes would you make? 
o Would you support cameras, and black boxes on board your 
boat? 
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Table 1a Relative catch rates when observers are 
present (1) and absent (0). 
OBS Ratioci 
YEAR 0 1 CPUE 
coo 1900 403.8257 788.1993 0.51234 
1981 488.625 945.2297 0.516938 
1982 600.3126 1000.65 0.599923 
1983 578.3213 1077.409 0.53677 
1984 802.2228 1088.108 0.737264 
1985 889.8159 889.9659 0.999831 
1986 977.1402 1354.378 0.721468 
1987 276.6554 745.0731 0.3713"13 
1988 644.0772 1513.672 0.425500 
1989 996.4777 1569.000 0.635101 
Coo Total 996.4777 1569.000 
Haddock 1980 311.4036 485.453 0.64147 
1981 314.638 538.3"165 0.584485 
1982 245.0842 352.8511 0.694583 
1983 192.5586 206.3884 0.932991 
1984 153.1367 156.0021 0.981632 
1985 214.1707 301.0721 0.71136 
1986 341.7249 335.1404 1.019647 
1987 80.09895 60.16902 1.331232 
1988 188.4507 124.3105 1.515967 
1989 276.6277 253.4064 1.091637 
Haddock Total 341.7249 538.3165 
Flounder 1980 124.6636 194.3702 0.641372 
1981 91.33724 128.6489 0.709973 
1982 85.79485 70.86922 1.210008 
1983 97.18438 55.5221 1.750373 
1984 142.3378 107.8256 1.320074 
1985 84.52942 112.7559 0.749667 
1986 81.39418 87.44742 0.930779 
1987 33.89092 36.3747 0.931717 
1988 52.31696 62.07847 0.842755 
1989 96.9405 8.2.16141 1.179879 
Flounder Total 142.3378 194.3702 
Table 1b. Ratio of lallded 
weighoots to obseiver estimates 
YEAR 
coo 1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1004 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Cod Total 
Haddock 1900 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
19813 
1989 
Haddock Total 
Flounder 1900 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
19135 
1986 
1987 
19813 
19139 
Flounder Total 
1 
0.935224 
0.896879 
1.081416 
1.553867 
1.0341314 
1.020176 
1.100323 
1.167563 
1.34399.2 
1.010104 
1.114736 
0.90436 
0.891368 
1.0139012 
1.059666 
1.0041345 
1.140014 
1.194603 
0.966579 
1.019392 
1.042148 
1.039.289 
0.993374 
1.30.29913 
1..250676 
.2.662361 
1.270737 
1.244543 
1.459301 
1.20ns2 
1.174709 
1 . .28.222.8 
1.384871 
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Table 1 c. ObseNer estimated 
discard rates. 
Discard rate 
YEAR 
coo 1980 
Cod Total 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Haddock 1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Haddock. Total 
Flounder 1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Flounder Total 
ObseNed 
1 
0.012729 
0.007082 
0.008689 
0.01043 
0.0174244 
0.0249936 
0.0361084 
0.0393682 
0.0423975 
0.0468156 
0.024604 
0.002216 
().003902 
0.010419 
0.039214 
0.063706 
0.057154 
0.105268 
0.04681 
0.019341 
0.028755 
0.037678 
0.019326 
0.039583 
0.105726 
0.064705 
0.082998 
0.135423 
0.111081 
0.054314 
0.077148 
0.000786 
0.077169 
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Table 2a 
Discards on Observ(1) aoo Non-observ(2) -1990 
Species Obsev 
1 2 Grand Total 
argentine 19450 0 19450 
cape !in 57000 0 57000 
catfish 0 1800 1800 
coo 1500037 371100 1877137 
dogfish 551975 304200 856175 
flatfish 1350 3025 4375 
grenadier 200 0 200 
haddock 27225 18010 43235 
halibut 2135 2100 4235 
herring 100 0 100 
invertebrat 250500 500 251000 
junk 8775 0 8775 
Lg.sharks 26614 7200 33814 
lobster 87 0 81 
!umpfish 58410 314350 372760 
mack era! 1200 50 1250 
plaice 72423 1800 74223 
pollock 96201 14025 110226 
r.hake 14150 1700 15850 
redfish 773650 129775 003425 
s.hake 35240 11050 46290 
scu!pin 47800 7700 55500 
shrimp 256858 17000 273858 
skates 1453475 1048835 2502310 
squid 2300 200 2500 
turbot 211230 93800 305030 
whiting 1250 2966 4216 
wt flounder 75316 12295 87611 
wt.perch 3800 4000 7800 
Grand Tot~ 5554751 2365481 7920232 
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Table 2b 
Discards on Observ(1) and Non-Observ(2) --1989 
Observ 
1 2 (blank) Grand Tott= 
argentine 0 25 0 25 
catfish 3150 2700 0 5850 
cod 2455270 777694 0 3232964 
dogfish 222970 369825 0 592795 
flatfish 100 475 0 575 
grenadier 1870 0 0 1870 
haddock 103495 32615 0 136110 
halibut 846 100 0 946 
herring 700 0 0 700 
imrertebrat 22163 48600 0 70763 
junk 11400 10200 0 21600 
Lg.sharks 27780 1000 0 28780 
lobster 340 170 0 510 
lumpfish 15660 69200 0 84860 
mackeral 1000 350 0 1350 
plaice 4101 4696 0 8797 
pollock 168050 97150 0 265200 
r.hake 0 2200 0 2200 
redfish 696509 68880 16000 781389 
s.hake 9125 28595 0 37720 
sculpin 5650 8900 0 14550 
shrimp 81800 0 0 8H~OO 
skates 856110 1419375 0 2275485 
squid 14763 1100 0 15863 
turbot 78837 19600 2600 101037 
whiting 7750 2800 0 10550 
wt flounder 78811 30005 0 108816 
Grand Tote 4868250 2900255 18600 7883105 
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Appendix 7 
Table 2c 
Discards on Observ(1) and Non-observ(2) trips -1988 
Observ 
1 2 GmndTota! 
0 500 500 
capelin 0 375 375 
catfish 10530 110 10040 
cOO 1019642 470995 1490037 
dogfish 159402 560200 710002 
haddock 36410 25373 61183 
halibut 350 800 1150 
invertebrat 1250 0 1250 
junk 2400 3625 6025 
Lg.sharks 10700 35500 46200 
lobster 1550 0 1550 
lumpfish 3800 0000 12800 
mackerai 5800 200 6000 
pollock. 47076 53133 100209 
r.hake 4100 68700 72800 
red fish 53955 251115 305070 
s.hake 26405 35305 61110 
sculpin 16525 4675 21200 
skates 668586.7 1210235 11378822 
squid 50 0 50 
turbot 500 26429 26929 
whiting 1400 9550 10950 
wt.fiounder 44140 62680 1001320 
wt.perch 300 0 300 
Grand Tot« 2114878 2828500 4943378 
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